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Abstract: South-South dynamic migrations offer the opportunity to some impoverished countries to establish a Diaspora outside their 
territorial bases in the perspective to address the issues raised by this phenomenon of extreme poverty from abroad. First of all, it is 
noteworthy that the volume of South-South dynamic migrations rises to more than 61 million people, versus 62 million people in the South-
North dynamic migrations. In other words, this increased propensity to mobility, which represents almost one billion people, nowadays 
concerns parts of the world that face extreme poverty respectively. The analysis of South-South dynamic migrations will focus our attention 
on one aspect of globalization that studies and expertise tend to avoid by focusing only on trading, goods and capital services. Apart from 
these various elements that contribute to globalization, it is necessary to include international migration to make the analysis more 
comprehensive. To paraphrase the words of the analyst Bruno Hérault, there is a new trend emerging in the context of the occurring 
exchanges between the two countries. However, according to the authors of the report posted by the UNDP in 2009, migration flows can be 
understood as a major vector for human development. In this regard, the report in question requires States to remove barriers in order to 
promote human development and allow human mobility. 
 
Keywords: center-local relations, urban and rural development, social policies, social stratification and social groups, migrations, 
inequalities. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Analysis of a South-South international migration: Chinese newcomers in Antananarivo 
and Dakar 
 
The theme of Chinese migrants in Antananarivo has been tackled by the geographer Catherine 
Fournet - Guerin, and that of Chinese migrants in Dakar, by the political scientist Antoine 
Kernen. In the context of this paper, it will be argued that the potential success of this 
globalization, which starts with the South, is based above all on the success of expatriate 
Chinese traders. This South-South migration flow, to put it that way, navigates through fields 
of contradictory powers, and may appear in this regard as an intrusion on a firm ground. To 
what extent expatriate Chinese traders would play an important role both in the economic life 
of Behoririka and Dakar, and this with their respective working methods? And what could be 
the overall impact of this dynamic South-South migration? The only substantial way to assess 
the legitimacy of a power is by gathering the views of those over whom it is exercised. The 
analysis of the international South-South migration, specifically targeting Chinese newcomers 
in Antananarivo, is an invitation to look at the way China – as an emerging country – is 
considering its geopolitical approach to Africa. Is its strategy in line with the socio-economic 
context, or is it disconnected?  
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- Firstly, a typology of different Chinese expatriates in Africa will be made in order to discuss 
the content of this South- South migration and highlight the various motives behind migration 
routes. 
- Secondly, this paper will analyze the step in relation to their local presence, with a focus on 
Chinese traders in Madagascar and Senegal, understood as the new Chinese migrants from 
Antananarivo and Dakar, from 2003 to 2012. 
Typology of a South /South migration flow 
The 750,000 Chinese expatriates in Africa are part of a South-South migration phenomenon 
that can be considered as lateral. According to figures provided by the Ministry of Commerce 
of the People's Republic of China, of a total of 672,724 migrant workers from China, it is 
noteworthy that 24,240 of them come from Fujian Province. Furthermore, we will see how the 
reasons for expatriation towards Africa differ from one category of Chinese migrants, as 
mentioned below, to another. Not only they allow us to insist on the characteristics of this 
South-South migration flow but also to split it into four categories of immigrants, highlight 
the importance of expatriation patterns and reveal its skeleton: 
Chinese merchants and self-entrepreneur expatriates in Africa are actors whose objective is to 
make money outside of their country since the 1990s. They are those who – as investors and 
newcomers of the latest decade – manage to find their way into the heart of the society in 
which they wish to settle down, and this in spite of a lack of resources, while being relatively 
effective. Once there, Chinese traders and entrepreneurs need one or more "key resource 
persons" to assist them in the development of their business. In the way of the Huaquio, this 
category of immigrants also plays the role of investors, although their access to credit remains 
difficult. They are not necessarily graduates. Some of them, driven by the desire to make 
money, have deliberately chosen to change occupations during their careers, while others, 
especially those from lower income groups, only aspire to improve their living conditions 
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thanks to trading businesses. Hence, there is a kind of porosity between coolies and traders. 
This category of immigrants does not seem to receive directives issued by the central 
government. Thus, and particularly for marketers and entrepreneurs who wish to settle 
permanently in Africa, there is a great concern over this category of immigrants. While most 
of them are of Chinese nationality, it is possible to also meet people in possession of a Hong 
Kong or French nationality. 
Indeed, in 1990, the handover of Hong Kong to China has also conditioned the arrival of 
Chinese in Africa. From these observations, what appears very clearly is a strong 
representation of middle-aged men in this activity area. According to the Malagasy newspaper 
La Gazette of the Big Island, it seems that this economic migration is also the fact of single 
women who have no more ties with their country of origin. 
The Huaquio are a wider category than the previous one. A large majority of them are 
graduates willing to build a strong international experience before seeking higher positions, 
and before rising up in the ranks inherent to the central government, either in the private or 
public sector. As the thugs of the Chinese central government, they can be found leading the 
900 major Chinese companies who officiate in Africa since the 1990s. Some of them were 
senior officials before moving into the private sector, others have taken the necessary steps in 
order to be promoted to higher positions such as the one of Ministry of Commerce. 
Such as, the central government strongly relies on them to orchestrate China’s African policy. 
These are the actors who receive specific directives from Beijing, and who are responsible for 
negotiating bilateral agreements with representatives of countries in receipt of China’s aid. 
They are also the main interlocutors of African regimes. In the context of such proceedings, 
they are welcomed as delegations by African elites. Moreover, they are among many foreign 
investors who transfer funds to Africa.  
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Indeed, unlike traders and entrepreneurs, access to credit is facilitated by the central 
government. The embassy staff, consuls, senior officials, diplomats and cooperating agents 
are state actors working directly with the central government. It is noteworthy that from 1982 
they were then recruited on the basis of an open competition which main content was 
language proficiency and a specialized knowledge of the region in which they were expected 
to be transferred. Most of them have been trained in the China Foreign Affairs University; a 
training centre for future Chinese diplomatic staff. 
Hence, Beijing has made every effort to diversify the profile of its diplomats ensuring on the 
one hand, the professionalization of the staff in charge of foreign policy, and on the other 
hand, by making them more effective for law and international trade. As a result, ideology is 
relegated in the background.  
In the light of the typology developed above, which classifies the various components 
inherent to this South-South migration of an inter-continental nature, it appears that some of 
them will necessarily come across other local migrants from Africa. This intra-continental 
route differs somewhat from that of the Chinese’s, be it in the peculiar aspect of their paths. 
On the other hand, African and Chinese migrants coincide in some respects in the motives 
that drive them to escape the phenomenon of poverty that afflicts their country of origin. As 
such, it appears that a complementary relationship may arise between some sections of 
Chinese migrants and certain segments of the African population. Regarding migration of 
coastal intra-continental from the periphery to the centre: different starting points being 
different towns, or neighbouring regions and impoverished provinces, and Antananarivo 
being the place of arrival. Originally, according to Hubert Deschamps, coastal people like 
many other Malagasy left their native country for the capital or for other major cities in order 
to be hired as part of seasonal and / or temporary works as labourers, rickshaw pullers or dock 
workers. 
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In fact, intra-continental migration movements could not be considered as definitive, and were 
not drawn exclusively from coastal community. In the past, it was not thus a question of 
exodus as such.  
Before the arrival of Chinese newcomers in Antananarivo, the goal of the actors of this intra-
continental mobility from Malagasy peripheral regions to the centre of the country was thus to 
supplement the active members of the nuclear family in the management of day-to-day needs. 
Indeed, the use of the latter having been weakened – particularly in the agricultural sector – 
because of restrictive measures of budget expenses, which also led many Malagasy 
schoolboys and students to give up their studies, different households in the countryside and 
surrounding provinces had to face this hardship. 
Following the arrival of large number of Chinese traders from the 1990s, those who will 
therefore benefit from this phenomenon are small street dealers from the coast of Madagascar, 
who will soon become their main customers, and manage to fill their moneybags. In other 
words, the recent arrival of Chinese traders and the social emergence of a new Chinese 
community in Antananarivo, are two most timely phenomena for coastal intra-continental 
migrants, whose objective is to find a job. These two related migration flows have resulted in 
a kind of agreement over best interests for both parties; a correlation of a meeting between 
Chinese migrants and Malagasy people. 
Moreover, given the many places in Antananarivo where, not only street vendors sell Chinese 
products (including textiles), and in the light of the huge number of Chinese shops that are 
now present in the streets of the capital, it makes sense to attribute the dynamism that 
characterizes the urban local retail trade to the development of a Chinatown in the very heart 
of Behoririka. Therefore, this social change, instilled by the arrival of Chinese traders in 
Antananarivo, provides an opportunity for some segments of the Malagasy population, 
especially small retailers, on the one hand to incorporate, and on the other hand, to access a 
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form of socialization through informal trade. For their part, the Chinese newcomers optimize 
their trading exchanges thanks to this collaboration, relying on small dealers who, in this 
respect, act as resource persons. 
Merina traders (Malagasy people from highlands also called Hovas) and Karana (Indo-
Pakistani), who were hitherto and undoubtedly accustomed to dominate the commercial 
sectors of the Malagasy capital, had to pander just after the massive arrival of Chinese 
retailers in Madagascar, and their range of products manufactured at low cost that swept the 
heart of the market. First, unlike the coastal migrants, these two ethnic groups live in the 
capital. Unable to lower their prices to the level of Chinese traders – which are significantly 
lower than those of the local market – the karana and Merina are severely affected by the 
repercussions of this phenomenon. Firstly, the result of the Chinese settlement in Behoririka, 
which is a consequential phenomenon to this South-South migration flow from China to 
Madagascar, is noticeable. Secondly, a profusion of manufactured goods coming from China 
can also be found in the heart of the Malagasy market. The inflation phenomenon, born in the 
1980s, which was long under the control of the Merina and karana traders, because of higher 
selling prices, has more or less been stemmed by allowing more purchasing power to the most 
disadvantaged Malagasy families. It is not only the competition in which karana and Merina 
traders are forced into that undermine their interests. Indeed, the Merina are faced with a kind 
of power embodied by a collective being: a host of Chinese actors, operating as networks and 
exercising a singular influence in a horizontal and private way. The fact of having classified 
and identified them gives us the opportunity to define the exercise of such a power, not in the 
Weberian sense, understood in its vertical binding and state dimension, but very far from all, 
in a Foucaldian statement, in which it appears as the result of a multiplicity of actors involved 
in the same social body. Moreover, the typology of Chinese migrants mentioned above allows 
us to unravel the tangle that represents the Chinese community of Antananarivo, identify 
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Sino-Malagasy social interactions that govern it and use it. Finally, whenever possible, this 
classification gives us the means to identify the collective logics and / or individuals to which 
Chinese and / or Malagasy actors adhere unanimously. At Behoririka, one of the places where 
Chinese and coastal interests are entrenched, few Merina and karana traders manage to adapt 
to this new mode of economic and commercial operation. In sum, Chinese’s commercial 
interests collide those of Merina and karana, while they branch out with the commercial 
interests of coastal people. Moreover, by force of circumstance, rather than confront them, 
most Merina and Karana have decided to give way to the Chinese merchants, then to settle 
near Behoririka. Like the Isotry market, which is in this respect a place of refuge by the 
boarder, where the karana are more or less away from the Chinese community present in the 
capital.   
Thus settled in an area which virtually looks like their last trading stronghold, the karana 
strive to mitigate the effects of Chinese competition on the economic and commercial field in 
Antananarivo. 
Therefore, it seems that Chinese traders from Antananarivo have immediately proved 
themselves as competitors, ignoring state force’s presence and jeopardizing local production. 
The socio-economic anchor of the new Chinese migrants to 
Madagascar (2003-2012) 
The earlier waves of Chinese migrants to Madagascar occurred from 1896 to 1901. They 
came from the Canton province toward Tamatave, while the recent waves of Chinese 
migrants toward Île Rouge came primarily, in the early 90s, from the Fujian province, under 
the chairmanship of Albert Zafy, to settle directly in the Malagasy capital. Antananarivo then 
already included a Chinese presence and for 14,000 nationals trading was a main activity. 
These are the earlier waves of newcomer immigrants that have imported into the capital of 
Madagascar this means of transport called "rickshaw” for which a fee applies. The Cantonese 
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newcomers coming from China arrived in Madagascar between 1786 and 1830 that is to say, 
in the premises of the French colonial period. Firstly as coolies, when trading economy 
reached its peak upon request of Gallieni, with a view to build the rail network that still 
connects today the axes: Fianarantsoa / Manakara Antananarivo / Antsirabe Antananarivo and 
/ Tamatave. 
The goal of Chinese coolies employed by France was to return home after having honoured 
their contracts. However, the importation of this Asian labour in Madagascar gave rise to an 
illegal presence of some Chinese who have decided to desert the construction sites because of 
the difficult conditions imposed by the French capital. Most of them eventually settled in a 
scattered manner and without any specific strategy as far as their social settlement in 
Madagascar is concerned. They are equally settled in Tamatave, Nosy Be, Antananarivo and 
Mahajanga. Some among the first Chinese migrants were even called to positions of deputies 
(Gema Guillaume was Chinese by his father, Anique Kenbazanamy and Horace Mann Thu 
June) or Senators (Catherine Chan Ah-Line, Ted Von Them Andrianasolo and Jean-Yves Mac 
Tong-Ki) in the Malagasy Republic. 
All these Malagasy personalities of Chinese origin might have to become the interlocutors of 
the Huaquio population. However, their emotional ties to their homeland remain distant. For 
others, some have found it more useful to turn to retail or to the food industry in the remote 
areas of the capital. 
After 1949, when the People's Republic of China was born, migrants from other provinces 
like Guangzhou, Fujian and Zhejiang have followed the first waves of migration and have 
later become Overseas Chinese. While the reasons of the newcomers were mainly economic, 
this wave of migration is driven by motives of a political, economic and demographic nature: 
the flight from Maoism, the access to a labour contract or overcrowding conditions. In the 
 9 
same way as their predecessors, they are also spread over the Red Island without necessarily 
trying to build an expatriate community with their compatriots. 
Each one of them has respectively opted for an economic and commercial activity, of a self-
entrepreneurial type in the retail sector. However, unlike their successors of the 1990s, and 
those who followed in the 2000s who had a strong socio-economic impact on the Malagasy 
situation, the spatial dispersal of the newcomers has reduced the possibility to generate any 
social changes. However, getting to know whether such a goal was or not part of the 
prerogatives of the first Chinese migrants of Madagascar is far from being obvious.  
In this particular case, as we shall see later, the same does not apply to the Chinese 
newcomers in Antananarivo, although the typology will help us to identify the shifts that may 
occur between the different categories. 
Antananarivo city has undergone many urban transformations in less than 350 years of 
existence. In addition, the recent arrival of Chinese migrants in the district of Behoririka goes 
along with those recent social economic and urban changes that we intend to study here. 
Indeed, the Malagasy capital has benefited from Chinese assistance for many infrastructure 
constructions such as: le Palais des sports et de la culture and the Mahamasina stadium. As an 
example, we can cite the Chinese company called Anhueï Foreign Economic Group, present 
in Madagascar for the last twenty years, which received a public contract by ministerial 
decree for the construction of offices in a district located in Antananarivo and that is called 
"the sixty-seven acres". 
The company must honour this order within ten years and four years have passed since the 
award of a public contract in 2008. On site, employees work from 7:00 am to 5:30 pm. There 
are about 200 employees in total, and only 10 of them are Chinese foremen who oversee the 
work of 190 other Malagasy workers and coolies. Chinese employees live on the construction 
site, in dormitories, at the rear of the site. These dormitories are also the offices of the 
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company. As for the Malagasy employees, they go home once their daily work is completed. 
However, besides many infrastructural renovations carried out by Chinese companies, it 
seems that the arrival of Chinese newcomers from Behoririka has also had an impact on the 
urban Malagasy capital. 
From now on, it will therefore be necessary to carefully trace the specific path of Chinese 
traders from Antananarivo, in order to assess its impact on the city centre. 
First, a description will be made of the administrative procedure to which Chinese traders are 
submitted prior to the step in respect to the regularization of their stay as independent 
investors on the Malagasy soil. Depending on the type of requests from the Chinese actors – 
may they come from either employees or investors – regulatory documents will vary. In 
addition to visas and passports, Chinese investors should obtain an official document in 
addition to the previous documents, namely, the CIPENS card (The professional identity card 
for unemployed foreigners). In contrast, Chinese employees will have an obligation to be in 
possession of similar identity cards to those of their compatriot’s, the only difference being 
that their employee status requires a work permit that will regulate their stay for a period of 
three years renewable. Upon acquisition of the CIPENS card, the regional branch of trade 
Analamanga requires from different economic operators a number of items to be added to 
their file, namely a supporting information sheet that includes: first and last names, date and 
place of birth and nationality. Their home address, place and date of issue of the residence 
card and / or passport will also have to be stated. Finally, the name of the class activity and 
written notification of the applicant stating the CIPENS card application will have to be 
mentioned.   
Regarding the documents for a new application, investors are asked to address a handwritten 
letter to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade, an extract of the criminal record 
from the country of origin issued within the last three months, a work permit or employment 
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for former employees (a certified copy), passport, residence permit and visa, for foreign 
residents, the tax position of the company. A photocopy of the status of the company, a 
certificate of existence of original place of operation issued from Fokontany, and finally, two 
recent passport photos. For any modifications or changes in circumstances: a handwritten 
letter to be addressed to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade, a photocopy of the 
status of the company, the minutes of the meetings, an original extraction and residence 
certificate issued from Fokontany and finally the tax position of the company.  
Given the note from the Ministry of Commerce and the General Secretariat of Commerce on 
18 October 2010 for the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade:  all operators are 
informed that in case of cessation of activity or bankruptcy, the return of the CIPENS card 
and / or accreditation card to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade is, given the 
regulations, mandatory. In conclusion, any violation of these provisions will lead to sanctions. 
The regional directorate of the Analamanga trade has identified in its register the 121 CIPENS 
card applications issued by Chinese investors since 1982.  
Once regulated in the host country as investors or employees, various Chinese actors will be 
structured in an expatriate community settling mainly in the shopping districts of Antananarivo 
and in particular in Behoririka’s. Buildings where Chinese traders live to organize their activity 
are also the places where they hire Chinese and Malagasy employees as resellers. They have 
made their home around Behoririka in small flats near their workplaces. In the suburbs of 
Antananarivo, Behoririka, Analakely and Soarano, Chinese shops are located around two five-
story buildings that dominate the area. They have mainly developed the first building. These 
buildings house on each floor, several point-of-sale for manufactured products from China. The 
acquisition of these buildings by Chinese migrants is the result of negotiations with members of 
wealthy Malagasy industrialist families called Ramaroson. As for the housings adjacent to the 
Chinese shops they have been rented and / or sold by a handful of entrepreneurs and investors – 
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as Chinese newcomers in the last decade – to the local bourgeoisie. The purchase of these 
houses by Chinese traders in this respect was an important step in the socio-economic anchor of 
the new Chinese migrants settled in the capital of Madagascar between 2003 and 2012.   
During this stage, first through their investments in real estate, the Chinese newcomers had now 
a base home. And in a second time, they could guarantee the arrival of future expatriates, while 
ensuring a place to dwell – this in addition to a sales job to be filled immediately – once there. 
In fact, an effective social solidarity seems to bring to the Chinese community of Behoririka an 
internal coherence. The socio-economic anchor of the new Chinese migrants of Madagascar has 
only been possible thanks to a disruption of the existing social hierarchy that was prior to their 
arrival in the field of economic and business capital. As seen previously, these newcomers were 
led to gradually replace the old local bourgeoisie in Behoririka, because of the inability of the 
latter to follow the price leadership of Chinese traders without causing the ruin of their own 
business. Because of this spatial occupation and eviction of their main competitors: this 
phenomenon constantly attracts a succession of Chinese newcomers continuing to expand the 
number of expatriates. It also confirms the ascendancy of the Chinese community on their main 
competitors Merina and karana, while promoting the movement of capital from China in and 
around the Malagasy city. Finally, it can be said that this anchor resulted in a recast of forces at 
work in Behoririka, and in the emergence of a new type of monopoly held this time by Chinese 
businessmen. 
As the focal point for the first investors in the 1990s, the district of Behoririka now allows 
Chinese trade to compartmentalize itself even within the occupied place, and leads to other 
adjoining market squares such as the market of Andranvoahangy, a market located in an area 
called the 67 hectares area as well as the market of Pochard and the Isotry’s one. In 2010, 
other Chinese investors have been welcomed by the former Minister of Public Works, on June 
16th, to finance future projects related to the economy. From Behoririka to Tsiazotafo: 
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- Tana Centre 
- Irresistible 
- Globe 
- Venic (Chaussurama) 
- Golden Centre 
- Advance Centre 
- Chinese hair salon 
From Behoririka to the city of Ankadifotsy: 
- C GL (Computer and Hi Fi Center) 
- Hi Fi Sarl King Lot IB 80 Bis 
- Supermarket Provident 
- SIMA-IMMO (Sino-Malagasy company specializing in real estate) Sarl Lot IVF10 
- Digital City 
In these places sometimes located in the outskirts, sometimes in the heart of Behoririka, 
other Chinese traders spread this form of economic and commercial expansion at the edge 
of the Malagasy capital, while small coastal resellers do the same with their own 
customers. 
The point is this Chinese trade manages to dominate this sector below the city centre, and 
also extends itself beyond the limits of Antananarivo – including through the street 
retailers from the coast – because the first Chinese expatriates were smart enough to 
cultivate good relationships with the "key actors" of the Malagasy capital. As resource 
persons, the illicit street vendors have acquired a good knowledge of tananarivian market 
and an accurate reading of its various irregularities since their arrival in the city centre. 
Creating networks among retailers clearly favours the resale of basic products imported 
from China and this has once again allowed Chinese traders to unquestionably ensure their 
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domination. Therefore, it is no happenstance if the district of Behoririka has been chosen 
by the Chinese community as business location. 
Chinese shops are starting to take by storm Isotry market; a market mainly structured by 
karana traders. This supermarket is kept by Chinese operators who import their supplies 
mainly from China. They essentially sell I'gasy electronic products from mobile phones, 
computers, monitors, television, hi-fi to cameras and laptops.  The brand belongs to the 
contractor Bao Lai, one of the largest fortunes in Madagascar. 
 
Other chain stores belonging to Bao Lai are installed throughout the ground floor of 
Independence Avenue. It seems that Chinese shopkeepers take gradually Isotry market, and 
this after having conquered the market of Behoririka. As mentioned above, small Malagasy 
retailers present in the capital, come mainly from the impoverished Malagasy coasts. They are 
the people who are busy at dawn before the Chinese shops where they buy great quantities of 
wholesale goods before selling them at retail on roadsides to customers beyond Antananarivo. 
Therefore, although it is not conspicuous, the contribution of local dealers is crucial. In other 
words, without them  – that is to say, deprived of these internal ramifications in Antananarivo 
and of its various external joints in the city centre – the Chinese trade of Madagascar would 
probably not have expanded so rapidly, even more so beyond the capital. Moreover, if the 
Chinese trade is so flourishing in and beyond Antananarivo this is also due to the fact that it 
allows to stem from the rising prices of basic products. 
As a matter of fact, from China, manufacturers take on responsibility of providing Chinese 
operators in Madagascar with bulky freight for importing products to the port of Tamatave. 
And nationals can be constantly supplied according to their orders. Compared to the 
Senegalese situation and because of the geographical proximity between Madagascar and 
China, migration flows from the Middle Kingdom are much more frequent, more numerous 
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and therefore more conspicuous in the Malagasy capital than in Dakar. Located on the eastern 
interface of the island, the port of Tamatave facilitates the access to capital, to products and to 
Chinese actors in Madagascar that transit by cargo through the Indian Ocean. Consequently, 
the Malagasy port area acts as a gateway for Chinese manufactured products. From 
Antananarivo, the port of Tamatave is six or seven hours away by car and one hour by plane. 
The relative proximity allows Chinese traders settled in Behoririka to send convoys to the 
portuary axis where the berthed vessels containing the various orders for manufactured 
products can be found. In short, the supply of Chinese shopkeepers based in Antananarivo is 
organized in the context of a traffic that extends from the place of manufacture of 
manufactured products, located in China to then go through the port of Tamatave, before 
being received as cargoes in Antananarivo. 
All things considered, the local implementation of new Chinese migrants in Antananarivo 
from 2003 to 2012 was primarily made through traders who previously invested funds to 
settle down in Antananarivo. Indeed, through them, the successive migratory waves will 
gradually incorporate the Chinese community of Antananarivo. These Chinese merchants 
were able to unite around them contacts to optimize the sales of their products manufactured 
at low prices and oust, at the same time the Malagasy competitors of Antananarivo. It is clear 
that this choice has proven successful, as these contacts – namely, the small coastal retailers – 
are unique when it comes to meet their clients at the right time, and to get to key places of the 
capital, in the purpose to sell regular China’s imports. Furthermore, in accordance with 
clichés that are usually fed about them, Chinese expatriate traders of Madagascar appear to be 
innovative workers. However, the Malagasy traders seem less inclined to work with the 
Chinese retailers from Antananarivo mentioned above. The fact that Chinese traders make it 
far more affordable than their competitors from Madagascar to buy imported Chinese goods 
seems to seriously threaten the local handicraft (a production that seems to be of a higher 
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standard, only because of the quality of raw materials from Madagascar), and create a 
situation of economic and commercial monopoly in the capital. 
 
The socio-economic homesteading of Chinese migrants in Senegal (2003-2013) 
As part of this South-south inter-continental migration, some Chinese migrants will be led to 
meet other migrants of Africa whose itinerary is different from theirs. As for the intra-
continental migration to Dakar, it is rather a rural exodus: the starting point is the groundnut 
basin area, and Dakar the point of destination. Striking event of the twentieth century, the 
economic hardship of the 1980s led many Senegalese – the Modu- Modu – to leave home and 
find work in the capital, and thus supplement the active members in a family nucleus by 
dealing with daily needs. Indeed, the use of the latter has been weakened because of the 
budget and expenditures restrictive measures, which also led many African pupils and 
students to drop out of school. As a consequence, different households located in rural areas 
and the provinces had to face up this situation. 
However, the actual deterioration of the socio-economic context strikes both cities and 
provinces. This is why, migrant workers whether previously schooled or not, had to take the 
necessary steps to face social disruption. This means that hiring, including in large cities, has 
become more difficult given the number of migrants who are now in the centre. In order to 
remedy this situation, the intra-continental migrant workers have chosen to retrain – retraining 
in which women have a place – in the trade as itinerant tradesmen, an informal status that 
allowed them to receive an income without having to pay taxes. They are the ones who will 
later benefit from the influx of Chinese traders from the 2000s, to become their major clients 
and fill their moneybags. As for The Baol - Baol – namely, the Lebanese and Senegalese 
traders – they are in a different perspective. 
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"The Baol-Baol movements have been studied on many occasions. They have been discussed 
in several approaches. Thus, from a historical perspective, some researchers have tried to 
show the migration paths of Baol-Baol since the birth of Mouridism, through the development 
of peanut cultivation, until the exodus to Dakar and then abroad. " 
They clearly cope with this South–South migration flow. It is not only the competition they 
are bound to that undermines their interests. Indeed, the Baol-Baol are confronted with a kind 
of power embodied in a collective being: a host of Chinese migrants acting in networks, 
exercising a singular influence horizontally and privately. Under the presidency of Abdoulaye 
Wade, more favourable to the Middle Kingdom than his predecessors, the Sino-Senegalese 
relations were resumed during the liberalization and economic opening of the Senegalese 
private sector. In accordance with the economic and commercial turning point wanted by 
Beijing, the terms of the Sino-Senegalese cooperation will fit into this perspective: three 
stadiums are currently being renovated by Chinese companies, and no less than eleven new 
stadiums are under construction. This China’s African policy manages to seduce the most 
senior African dignitaries because its offer adequately respond to the specific needs of its 
partners namely, a relatively low industrialization and deficiencies in infrastructure, and this, 
without political conditionalities. The work in progress of the National Theatre in Dakar 
meets in turn a different logic; it is an integral part of the construction projects of prestigious 
buildings which purpose is to expose to the world the know-how of Chinese architects. By 
maintaining – what obviously appears as a constant in China’s African politics – unbeatable 
prices and a speed of execution from its workers, Beijing highlights these two pillars to attract 
future clients. In this sense, in the year 2005, several agreements were signed between the two 
political systems, which include agreement on major loans: the installation of a central Dakar, 
to strengthen and renew networks and the aging electrical wiring of the capital. 
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How Beijing manages to reconcile these two requirements at the heart of an important foreign 
policy? Obviously, the downside of the latter has to be updated.  Indeed, within the huge 
construction sites, the Chinese workers are paid very little compared to the difficulty of the 
work performed. Indeed, most of the workers do the dirty work without sophisticated 
equipments. They allow themselves but few breaks and work without necessarily wearing 
headgear and without worrying about the sun above their heads. In addition, piled up on each 
other – for the entire duration of their contract – in habitats, adjacent buildings and 
sometimes, in unhealthy dormitories, they live behind closed doors. As total wage-bill, these 
employees make up a low cost and are extremely profitable for the foremen who employ 
them. In sum, whether in terms of hardship, insecurity and wage amount, it seems that the 
Chinese expatriate workers do not have their say. Indeed, given the more than modest social 
origin of the coolies, they do not have the possibility to refuse such working conditions. In 
addition, these contractors make little use of machines because they rely primarily on the 
strength and hard work of these employees. 
Initially, a few pioneers were already in Dakar since 1990 and well before the Chinese 
newcomers in Senegal since October 25 2005, but these two waves of migration come from 
Henan province. It is likely that the first Chinese have uncovered the best opportunities, both 
in terms of purchase or rental of housing and for business as such. Chinese traders and 
entrepreneurs settled down in the 2000s. 
They constitute the bulk of the Chinese newcomers in Dakar who engage in mercantilism, 
around which crawl a multitude of small Senegalese resellers. There are over a hundred 
Chinese merchants, from Papa Gueye Fall driveway to Centennial Avenue, in the city of 
Dakar, where these two categories of actors come together regularly. Obviously, some 
Senegalese can be counted among employees working in these outlets. This studied area now 
hosts the largest Chinese community in Dakar, while Independence Avenue was originally a 
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tourist place. It is noteworthy that Chinese traders’ choice of location is clearly not down to 
chance. "Centrally located, the boulevard is surrounded by major markets: Sandaga Colobane, 
HLM, Tilène." A variety of manufactured products as diverse as clothing, locks, shoes, 
sandals, loincloths, plastic toys, small portraits with images of  the Baye Fall and Murid 
marabouts, clocks or kitchen utensils, made in China before being widely sold in the heart of 
the Senegalese market at unbeatable prices can be found. More discreetly, in the 1990s, and 
then massively over the years 2000 to 2005, Chinese traders have bought most of the ground 
floors, patios or garages of Independence Avenue to settle there and do business. 
"For most traders, the man came first and set up the shop, and then the woman came and 
joined him. Later still, if the deal goes, a cousin will come and assist them. " 
The aim of the Chinese newcomers is to delegate the management of the business as quickly 
as possible to their relatives to be supplemented in this task. The state of mind that drives and 
structures the group and also promotes its cohesion is that both employers and employees take 
part in these challenges. In this sense, the collective emulation that is unfolded on a daily 
basis motivates the members of the expatriate community: if the boss lived in a spacious villa 
while his employees were forced to stay under stringent conditions, this state of mind would 
be lost. As for Western bosses, they tend to lead a lavish lifestyle in the most beautiful 
African hotels, or in residential areas, thus living far from local realities. "Chinese from Dakar 
live near their stores in the Colobane and Medina neighbourhoods (...)." Chinese were stuffed 
into sorts of crowded dormitories or settlements that were nothing less than unhealthy. 
Gradually, by renting the two-story buildings that line both sides of the avenue, they were 
able to settle on the spot, and thus became key economic actors from the centre of Dakar, 
from which a huge quantity of products manufactured throughout the territory and beyond are 
sold. Whether they are stalls or furnished shops, some outlets are rented or sold at a good 
price to Chinese traders. 
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The bordering owners of these properties – i.e.: ground floor, sheds, patios and garages of 
Independence Avenue – are former executives of the Senegalese public service or retirees 
who used to work in the private sector and had experienced the post-independence period. 
These future stores of about 16 square meters, which were previously leased for a monthly 
cost up to 15,000 CFA francs, are currently leased or sold to Chinese merchants at a rate two 
to three times the original cost. In other words, these rents represent a significant source of 
income for these former employees. Beyond the financial aspect, it is noteworthy that the 
discreet behaviour of the future residents of the avenue, to say the least, seems to have worked 
in their favour in order to acquire such property. Once there, it was of paramount importance 
for Chinese traders to attract and keep their Senegalese customers which was far from being 
easy given the local competition they had to face. However, breaking the market prices and 
competing on the variety of products (although the quality of the products cannot be taken for 
granted), Asian merchants have succeeded within five years to attract on the one hand, many 
Senegalese consumers whose purchasing power was, until then, far from enough. And on the 
other hand, the street vendors have also found their needs catered as far as the selling prices 
offered by Chinese shopkeepers are concerned. In this sense, what was supposed to be at first 
a road shopping district has gradually become a stronghold for the Chinese trade in Dakar. As 
a matter of fact, while strolling on Centennial Avenue, many stalls of manufactured products 
imported from China held by Senegalese resellers can be found. They purchase greater 
quantities of Chinese products than any other consumer. Note that some shops located near 
the Chinese shops are run by Senegalese. It is suspected that these new owners and / or 
tenants were former street retailers who have managed to set up their own business thanks to 
the Chinese economic implantation in Dakar. Somehow, the presence of these street dealers 
increases Chinese trade in Dakar, and hence suit the businesses of Chinese traders, fortiori, 
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when they belong to the Murid and Baye Fall brotherhood. Indeed, these two religious groups 
are respectively driven by the same mystical work, and are skilled in a specific discipline.   
In order to manage their different institutions on a daily basis, Chinese actors have chosen to 
reside in the surroundings of Centenaire Avenue. Given the age of the Chinese businesses 
located throughout the Papa Gueye Fall driveway, if compared to the Centenaire driveway, 
we will use the term of stalls to designate these small places run by Chinese actors,  these 
shops are less busy – both in terms of clients, diverse goods and Senegalese staff – than the 
shops. For example, the stores have equipped warehouses.  
By contrast, as far as the new institutions on Centenaire Avenue are concerned, we will rather 
call them shops, knowing that unlike stalls, shopkeepers seem to be able to count Senegalese 
vendors among them. Even if most of the best sellers of Senegalese origin have been 
employed in some of the shops on the shopping street, the owners of these outlets are 
Chinese. The fact of selling the same items than their local competitors, by breaking the sales 
price, gives a near-monopoly to Chinese traders. Their task is all the more made easier 
because among vendors they hire on site, those who are hired are among the best ones on the 
market. This is why "the Chinese staff does not take centre stage in the stalls of Dakar.  "In 
addition, they act as interpreters to overcome the ignorance of the national languages of their 
bosses. Since manufactured products are sold at low cost, it becomes very difficult for 
Senegalese buyers / consumers to negotiate lower prices. Located in Yiwu for Chinese and 
Dubai for their Lebanese and Senegalese competitors, supplies places vary according to 
traders.  Cargo containers come every day to replenish Chinese shops of the avenue, whereas 
Senegalese and Lebanese traders used to go and buy their products by themselves in China. 
Beijing has found it more appropriate to manage these sectors itself. According to the idea of 
just-in-time production, Chinese traders place their orders on the spot that is to say, in China, 
speaking directly to their suppliers or from their place of residence, to, a priori embassies. 
 22 
Regardless of the process, the materials for the production of manufactured goods are sent by 
shiploads in spare parts to the port of Dakar in containers. In short, suppliers constantly 
supply Chinese traders settled there, according to their respective claims.  Once the delivery is 
received, the products are put together before being sold, avoiding at the same time the 
shipping costs. As such, the most important customers for the sustainability for the business 
of Chinese newcomers do not lie on the side of Senegalese buyers / consumers who buy 
products in single, but on the side of the buyers / retailers to whom they negotiate wholesale 
prices, who are responsible to sell the products themselves. In terms of profitability and flow 
of stocks, the role of buyers / retailers is hence crucial for the success of Chinese business. 
"Once the Senegalese retailers have opened an "account" with them, they take a shipment of 
items to resell them. But initially, the new Senegalese resellers need to be introduced by the 
oldest retailers to start working. And it is only later that the network functions. In a way, the 
old resellers are a guarantee for the newcomers, considering that Chinese traders can not so 
easily sell their products without intermediaries. On the other hand, Senegalese resellers will 
not waste their own livelihood. So in the morning resellers take their pack of goods in Chinese 
shops, and when the whole of the merchandise has been sold, they come to replenish supplies 
again giving back unsold items. Once the relationship is established the network works almost 
by itself. " 
As for Senegalese buyers / resellers, they have all the necessary latitude to set the profit 
margin they will make out of their street hawking. Indeed, the informal nature, or the other 
side of this business, gives buyers / consumers the opportunity to negotiate or revise 
downward the prices offered by buyers / resellers without necessarily having door slammed as 
it is the case when dealing with Chinese traders. Regarding the Senegalese buyers / retailers 
of Murid and Baye Fall obedience, work is seen as a form of purification to which the 
believer must submit and this singularly spiritual representation of labour increases members’ 
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efficiency in their daily tasks, especially in the context of trade. Many Murid have opted for 
informal trade. And gradually, they took control of the Dakar economy through networking 
activities, to such an extent that some of them have migrated to the United States and Italy.  In 
that same informal sector, the Baye Fall brotherhood is not far behind. Somehow, these 
buyers / resellers soften the production circuit organized by the Chinese during the sale, 
streamlining the flow of manufactured goods. However, residential buyers / resellers, whose 
stalls manufactures are located near the Chinese shops, and throughout Centenaire Avenue, 
have, it seems, far less flexibility compared to those who choose to sell their products as 
hawkers. In addition, the fact of knowing precisely the dates and places where national 
holidays (April 4), religious (Eid El Kebir), holidays, weddings and other events are 
celebrated, increases Senegalese retailers efficiency. Because of these parameters, resellers 
are prominent for the success of Chinese's trade. Moreover, as previously seen, not only the 
avenue is surrounded by major business centres such as Tilène, Sandaga and Colobane but in 
extenso, Chinese manufactured products can also circulate in neighbouring regions namely, 
Gambia, Mali, Guinea- Bissau, Guinea- Conakry and Sierra Leone.  
As for the conflicts that may arise in the context of the relationships between 
Senegalese and Chinese from Dakar, it seems they may be generated by Senegalese traders 
and entrepreneurs. Indeed, the big losers in this economic liberalization orchestrated by 
Abdoulaye Wade are local craftsmen, that is to say, shoemakers or weavers, who saw their 
sales literally collapse from the years 2000-2005, time when their Chinese competitors arrived 
in the capital of Dakar. The Unacois (National Union of Traders and Industrialists of Senegal) 
said that competition is unfair and prejudicial to the Senegalese entrepreneurs who previously 
exercised a monopoly on trade in Dakar, because the Chinese have no annual charges and do 
not take real risks when opening their shops because local authorities turn a blind eye on the 
illegal practices and encourage the arrival of Chinese migrants in Senegal. According to the 
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representatives of the Unacois, many traders and local craftsmen have ceased their activities 
because of these Chinese newcomers since 2005.  It even seems that some crafts have been 
plagiarized by Chinese traders who then sold them on the market without paying any user 
fees. For some of these crafts, it is a whole know-how that tends to disappear in favour of 
large Chinese distribution network which size is such that it is difficult to cope with. Indeed, 
the Senegalese weavers focus on the quality / price ratio. However, despite a better quality 
than the Chinese textile ones, Senegalese buyers / consumers have a preference for products 
imported from China. De facto, the Senegalese and Lebanese traders adapt to the Chinese 
presence by diversifying storehouses. In sum, the Senegalese artisanal sector is a victim of 
counterfeiting organized by manufacturers in China and Chinese traders expatriates in Africa, 
who reproduce several copies of traditional clothing models from the African market in order 
to sell them in the same market without any intervention from the authorities. Eventually, if 
not heard by governments that hide in silence, these complaints are likely to escalate. It is 
quite possible that the Unacois takes resolutions, by committing acts of vandalism against 
Chinese shops. Paradoxically, the same indifference can be observed from the part of huaquio 
against Chinese trader expatriates and their possible grievances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
